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Rationalist Muslims identify themselves as Khomeinists because they regard Rūḥollāh Khomeini as the figure who inaugurated the Revival Era through revolution, resistance, and the reanimation of the Muhammadan movement under modern conditions. This designation is strengthened by the fact that many adherents are near-contemporaries of that era and therefore understand it not merely as distant history, but as a living civilisational turning point. They venerate Khomeini for his emphasis on Muslim unity, his refusal to allow minor jurisprudential, and even certain doctrinal, differences to eclipse larger geopolitical and moral struggles, and his attempt to restore religion to the plane of historical agency. They also esteem his philosophy, mysticism, poetry, politics, geopolitical vision, anti-imperialism, his opposition to ethnosupremacy including Zionism, his unwavering dedication to the oppressed including Palestinians, Black people, and victims of Western hegemony, as well as his charisma, bidomainal genius, willingness to override rigid jurisprudential dogmatism, and for his commitment to the many modern challenges of anti-imperialist resistance economy. Rationalist Muslims often repeat a maxim when discussing the idea of the Philosopher King: Plato conceived it, Jesus tried it, Muḥammad achieved it, Khomeini revived it. | Rationalist Muslims identify themselves as Khomeinists because they regard Rūḥollāh Khomeini as the figure who inaugurated the Revival Era through revolution, resistance, and the reanimation of the Muhammadan movement under modern conditions. This designation is strengthened by the fact that many adherents are near-contemporaries of that era and therefore understand it not merely as distant history, but as a living civilisational turning point. They venerate Khomeini for his emphasis on Muslim unity, his refusal to allow minor jurisprudential, and even certain doctrinal, differences to eclipse larger geopolitical and moral struggles, and his attempt to restore religion to the plane of historical agency. They also esteem his philosophy, mysticism, poetry, politics, geopolitical vision, anti-imperialism, his opposition to ethnosupremacy including Zionism, his unwavering dedication to the oppressed including Palestinians, Black people, and victims of Western hegemony, as well as his charisma, bidomainal genius, willingness to override rigid jurisprudential dogmatism, and for his commitment to the many modern challenges of anti-imperialist resistance economy. Rationalist Muslims often repeat a maxim when discussing the idea of the Philosopher King: Plato conceived it, Jesus tried it, Muḥammad achieved it, Khomeini revived it. | ||
== | == Dialectical ladder == | ||
The method is named after Plato's ''dialektikē'' (διαλεκτική), or dialectic, and his search for an ''archē'' (ἀρχή), a first principle. Its opening is a Hikmati development rather than a quotation of Plato: the immediate datum of phenomenal consciousness, understood through the ancestral Platonic term ''psychē'' (ψυχή). From there it distinguishes logical conditions, epistemic commitments, proposed metaphysical conclusions, ethical commitments, practices of cultivation, social obligations, and institutional consequences. | The method is named after Plato's ''dialektikē'' (διαλεκτική), or dialectic, and his search for an ''archē'' (ἀρχή), a first principle. Its opening is a Hikmati development rather than a quotation of Plato: the immediate datum of phenomenal consciousness, understood through the ancestral Platonic term ''psychē'' (ψυχή). From there it distinguishes logical conditions, epistemic commitments, proposed metaphysical conclusions, ethical commitments, practices of cultivation, social obligations, and institutional consequences. | ||
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'''Comparative qualification:''' Terms in the comparative lists are affinities or interpretive analogues, not assertions of historical identity. Duplicate or unusual terms appearing in the existing lists have deliberately been retained. | '''Comparative qualification:''' Terms in the comparative lists are affinities or interpretive analogues, not assertions of historical identity. Duplicate or unusual terms appearing in the existing lists have deliberately been retained. | ||
== 1 Soul | === 1. Psychē (Soul) === | ||
''Al-Nafs (النفس) • Ātman (आत्मन्) • Psychē (ψυχή)'' | ''Al-Nafs (النفس) • Ātman (आत्मन्) • Psychē (ψυχή)'' | ||
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<br />- Al-Kindī, Risāla fī al-Ḥīla li-Dafʿ al-Aḥzān (On Dispelling Sadness), § XIV.1 | <br />- Al-Kindī, Risāla fī al-Ḥīla li-Dafʿ al-Aḥzān (On Dispelling Sadness), § XIV.1 | ||
=== Phenomenal consciousness === | ==== Phenomenal consciousness ==== | ||
Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective qualitative character of experience, including the felt character of perception, emotion and sensation. In plain language, what it feels like to see colour, experience pain or be aware at all. This is the opening datum, not a conclusion derived from earlier beliefs: even questioning experience occurs within experience. | |||
== 2 Know yourself | Since contemplation begins from the undeniable presence of experience, phenomenal consciousness is the first datum from which the architecture proceeds. the subjective, first-person "what it is like" experience of being alive, encompassing feelings, sensations, and perceptions like seeing color or feeling pain. | ||
=== 2. Gnōthi seauton (Know yourself) === | |||
''Ātma-jñāna (आत्मज्ञान) • Gnōthi seauton (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) • Maʿrifat al-nafs (معرفة النفس)'' | ''Ātma-jñāna (आत्मज्ञान) • Gnōthi seauton (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) • Maʿrifat al-nafs (معرفة النفس)'' | ||
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<br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | <br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | ||
=== Reflexive self-awareness === | ==== Reflexive self-awareness ==== | ||
Reflexive self-awareness is conscious awareness directed at one's own ongoing mental activity, without necessarily presupposing a substantial or enduring ego. In plain language, noticing that one is aware, thinking or experiencing. Once experience is present, attention can turn toward experiencing itself; noticing this does not by itself establish a permanent, immaterial or substantial self. | |||
Acknowledgement of present experience permits, at minimum, awareness that experience is present; whether this establishes an enduring self is left open. | |||
== 3 The Other | === 3. Heteron (The Other) === | ||
''Al-Ghayriyya (الغيرية) • Heteron (ἕτερον)'' | ''Al-Ghayriyya (الغيرية) • Heteron (ἕτερον)'' | ||
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<br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | <br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | ||
=== Experiential differentiation === | ==== Experiential differentiation ==== | ||
Experiences exhibit discernible differences, such as pain and colour. Therefore, inquiry already presupposes distinguishability. Difference in experience does not yet establish independent external substances. | |||
== 4 Sameness | Experiential differentiation is the phenomenal discriminability of two or more experienced qualities, contents or episodes. In plain language, a sensation of red can be experienced as different from a sound or pain. Experience includes distinguishable qualities and contents; recognising their differences does not alone establish the existence of independently real external substances. | ||
=== 4. Tauton (Sameness) === | |||
''Al-Huwiyya (الهوية) • Tauton (ταὐτόν)'' | ''Al-Huwiyya (الهوية) • Tauton (ταὐτόν)'' | ||
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<br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | <br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | ||
=== Law of identity === | ==== Law of identity ==== | ||
Every being is identical with itself, and every proposition is what it is rather than something else. A thing cannot be treated as determinate unless it possesses some identity by virtue of which it is distinguishable from what it is not. Likewise, a proposition cannot be meaningful unless it has a stable content rather than collapsing into indeterminacy. | |||
The Law of Identity is therefore the most basic condition of intelligibility: without it, thought loses its object, language loses reference, and reasoning loses all determinate content. | |||
To recognise any distinguishable content as that content requires treating it as self-identical (A = A). This is a logical condition of coherent reference, not a derived empirical discovery. | |||
== 5 Limit | Law of identity is the classical logical principle that each entity is identical with itself and each determinate proposition retains its content. In plain language, a thing is itself, not something else, in the respect being discussed. Recognising something as a determinate experiential content presupposes treating it as that very content. Identity is therefore a condition of coherent recognition, not an observed physical law. | ||
=== 5. Peras (Limit) === | |||
''al-taʿayyun (التعيّن) • Peras (πέρας)'' | ''al-taʿayyun (التعيّن) • Peras (πέρας)'' | ||
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<br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | <br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | ||
=== Determinacy of content === | ==== Determinacy of content ==== | ||
The use of identity in discourse requires sufficiently determinate subject and predicate senses; otherwise a purported contradiction or entailment may be mere equivocation. | |||
== 6 | Determinacy of content is the specification of a sufficiently definite meaning, boundary or identity to make a claim assessable. In plain language, we must know what a claim refers to before testing it. The use of identity in discourse requires sufficiently determinate subject and predicate senses; otherwise a purported contradiction or entailment may be mere equivocation. | ||
=== 6. Tauton tanantia (The same thing and opposites) === | |||
''ʿadam al-tanāquḍ (عدم التناقض) • Tauton tanantia (ταὐτὸν τἀναντία)'' | ''ʿadam al-tanāquḍ (عدم التناقض) • Tauton tanantia (ταὐτὸν τἀναντία)'' | ||
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<br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | <br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | ||
=== Law of non-contradiction === | ==== Law of non-contradiction ==== | ||
No entity or proposition can both possess and not possess the same attribute in the same respect at the same time. To deny this is not to embrace profundity, but to dissolve the distinction between affirmation and negation altogether. If contradiction were admissible at the level of principle, then no claim could be meaningfully excluded, no conclusion could be preferred to its negation, and reasoned judgement would become impossible. | |||
The Law of Non-Contradiction therefore safeguards coherence by preserving the difference between what is the case and what is not. | |||
Dialectical transition: Plato argues that the same thing cannot perform or undergo opposites simultaneously in the same respect (Republic 436b–c). The modern law of contradiction must distinguish strict contradictories from mere contraries; identity alone does not formally prove it. | |||
== 7 Being and non-being | Law of non-contradiction is the classical prohibition on a proposition being both true and false in the same sense, time and respect. In plain language, the very same claim cannot be both affirmed and denied under identical conditions. Plato argues that the same thing cannot perform or undergo opposites simultaneously in the same respect (Republic 436b–c). The modern law of contradiction must distinguish strict contradictories from mere contraries; identity alone does not formally prove it. | ||
=== 7. On / mē on (Being and non-being) === | |||
''On / mē on (ὄν / μὴ ὄν) • qānūn al-thālith al-marfūʿ (قانون الثالث المرفوع)'' | ''On / mē on (ὄν / μὴ ὄν) • qānūn al-thālith al-marfūʿ (قانون الثالث المرفوع)'' | ||
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<br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | <br />- Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, al-Nafs, I.1 | ||
=== Law of excluded middle === | ==== Law of excluded middle ==== | ||
For any fully determinate proposition P under classical two-valued semantics, P or not-P. This does not follow from identity or non-contradiction alone in every logic; the classical semantic assumption must be declared. | |||
== 8 Truth | Law of excluded middle is the classical principle that every determinate proposition is either true or its negation is true. In plain language, for an ordinary definite claim, either it holds or it does not. For any fully determinate proposition P under classical two-valued semantics, P or not-P. This does not follow from identity or non-contradiction alone in every logic; the classical semantic assumption must be declared. | ||
=== 8. Alētheia (Truth) === | |||
''al-ḥaqq / al-ṣidq (الحق / الصدق) • Alētheia (ἀλήθεια) • Satya (सत्य)'' | ''al-ḥaqq / al-ṣidq (الحق / الصدق) • Alētheia (ἀλήθεια) • Satya (सत्य)'' | ||
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<br />- Al-Kindī, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy), I | <br />- Al-Kindī, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy), I | ||
=== Alethic realism === | ==== Alethic realism ==== | ||
Since phenomenal consciousness distinguishes between appearance, assertion, denial, error, and correction, the distinction between truth and falsehood is derived. asserting that the truth of beliefs, statements, or propositions is objective and determined by whether the world actually is as that statement claims, rather than depending on human minds. | |||
Dialectical transition: That appearance and judgement can diverge supplies a reason to distinguish what seems true from what is true. Mind-independent truth requires a further realist premise about correctness, not simply the existence of experience. | |||
Alethic realism is the thesis that truth is a property of claims determined by how things are, rather than by mere preference or endorsement. In plain language, believing or wanting something does not by itself make it true. That appearance and judgement can diverge supplies a reason to distinguish what seems true from what is true. Mind-independent truth requires a further realist premise about correctness, not simply the existence of experience. | |||
== 9 Knowledge ''Epistēmē'' == | === 9. Knowledge ''Epistēmē'' === | ||
''al-ʿilm (العلم) • Epistēmē (ἐπιστήμη)'' | ''al-ʿilm (العلم) • Epistēmē (ἐπιστήμη)'' | ||
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<br />- Al-Kindī, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy), I | <br />- Al-Kindī, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy), I | ||
=== Epistemic realism === | ==== Epistemic realism ==== | ||
Since truth and falsehood are real distinctions, it is possible to know truth or at least approach it, hence Epistemic realism. | |||
Dialectical transition: If judgements can answer to truth, inquiry can aim at warranted true belief. The stronger claim that reliable knowledge is possible is supported by successful cognition, not deduced from the existence of truth alone. | |||
== 10 Capacity and knowledge | Epistemic realism is the commitment that knowledge of reality is possible, though particular claims may remain fallible. In plain language, people can genuinely learn things about the world. If judgements can answer to truth, inquiry can aim at warranted true belief. The stronger claim that reliable knowledge is possible is supported by successful cognition, not deduced from the existence of truth alone. | ||
''Buddhi (बुद्धि) • Dynamis / epistēmē (δύναμις / ἐπιστήμη) • quwwat al-idrāk / al-ʿaql (قوة الإدراك / العقل)'' | |||
=== 10. Dynamis / epistēmē (Capacity and knowledge) === | |||
''Buddhi (बुद्धि) • Dynamis / epistēmē (δύναμις / ἐπιστήμη) • quwwat al-idrāk / al-ʿaql (قوة الإدراك / العقل) • Discernment • Higher Mind • Light of Intelligence • Ratio Rationality Reason • Logos • Noetic Faculty • Nous • Understanding'' | |||
''“...one power, whether we should call it soul or something else, by which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.”'' | ''“...one power, whether we should call it soul or something else, by which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.”'' | ||
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<br />- Al-Kindī, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy), I | <br />- Al-Kindī, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā (On First Philosophy), I | ||
=== Epistemic capacity === | ==== Epistemic capacity ==== | ||
Since it is possible to know truth or at least approach it, the human being must possess a capacity by which knowledge, judgement, and discernment are possible, hence Epistemic capacity. | |||
== 11 Reasoning, spirit and appetite | Dialectical transition: Successful episodes of knowing manifest capacities of perception, inference and correction. This is a modest inference to an exercised ability rather than to an infallible faculty. | ||
''al-quwā al-mudrika wa-l-ghaḍabiyya wa-l-shahwāniyya (القوى المدركة والغضبية والشهوانية) • Logistikon, thymoeides, epithymētikon (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, ἐπιθυμητικόν)'' | |||
Epistemic capacity is the capacity to form, assess, retain and correct beliefs on the basis of perception and reasoning. In plain language, our ability to notice, learn, judge and revise. Successful episodes of knowing manifest capacities of perception, inference and correction. This is a modest inference to an exercised ability rather than to an infallible faculty. | |||
== 11. Logistikon, thymoeides, epithymētikon (Reasoning, spirit and appetite) == | |||
''al-quwā al-mudrika wa-l-ghaḍabiyya wa-l-shahwāniyya (القوى المدركة والغضبية والشهوانية) • Logistikon, thymoeides, epithymētikon (λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές, ἐπιθυμητικόν) • Hierarchy of faculties • Trilogy of mind • Tripartite soul'' | |||
''“...learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire...”'' | ''“...learn with one part of ourselves, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire...”'' | ||
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=== Cognitive–affective–conative triad === | === Cognitive–affective–conative triad === | ||
Since the human being must possess a capacity by which knowledge, judgement, and discernment are possible (Epistemic capacity), and since this capacity and other capacities, such as feeling and intention, are not identical (Law of identity), the human being is essentially composed of cognition (thinking), affect (feeling), and conation (doing), hence the Cognitive–affective–conative triad. | |||
Dialectical transition: Knowing, feeling and striving can be distinguished analytically, though real mental processes overlap; this modern tripartition should not be equated point-for-point with Plato’s three-part soul. | |||
Cognitive–affective–conative triad is a heuristic differentiation of cognitive, affective and conative psychological functions. In plain language, thinking, feeling and wanting are distinguishable aspects of mental life. Knowing, feeling and striving can be distinguished analytically, though real mental processes overlap; this modern tripartition should not be equated point-for-point with Plato’s three-part soul. | |||
== 12 Intellect and intellection | == 12. Nous kai noēsis (Intellect and intellection) == | ||
''al-ʿaql / al-idrāk al-ʿaqlī (العقل / الإدراك العقلي) • Buddhi (बुद्धि) • Nous / noēsis (νοῦς / νόησις)'' | ''al-ʿaql / al-idrāk al-ʿaqlī (العقل / الإدراك العقلي) • Buddhi (बुद्धि) • Nous / noēsis (νοῦς / νόησις)'' | ||
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=== Noetic discernment === | === Noetic discernment === | ||
Since the human being is essentially composed of the Cognitive–affective–conative triad, and since it must possess a capacity by which knowledge, judgement, and discernment are possible (Epistemic capacity), that capacity is the intellect, hence Noetic discernment. | |||
== 13 Love of truth | Among cognitive powers, intellect is the function that assesses reasons, identifies contradictions and integrates understanding. Its existence does not yet establish that its verdicts are always correct. | ||
Noetic discernment is rational apprehension and appraisal of intelligible relations, arguments and explanatory structures. In plain language, understanding reasons and recognising what follows from them. Among cognitive powers, intellect is the function that assesses reasons, identifies contradictions and integrates understanding. Its existence does not yet establish that its verdicts are always correct. | |||
== 13. Alētheian stergein (Love of truth) == | |||
''Alētheian stergein (ἀλήθειαν στέργειν) • ikhlāṣ / ṣidq / amāna (إخلاص / صدق / أمانة)'' | ''Alētheian stergein (ἀλήθειαν στέργειν) • ikhlāṣ / ṣidq / amāna (إخلاص / صدق / أمانة)'' | ||
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=== Epistemic integrity === | === Epistemic integrity === | ||
Preference for truth over comfort | |||
This disposition is the willingness to subordinate psychological ease, inherited familiarity, social approval, and personal convenience to what one has best reason to judge true. It entails a principled resistance to self-deception, motivated reasoning, sentimental attachment to falsehood, and the refusal to revise one’s position when evidence or argument requires it. Without such a preference, reason becomes merely instrumental: a tool for decorating prior loyalties rather than correcting them. | |||
Preference for truth over comfort is therefore the first moral discipline of the intellect, and the condition of all genuine intellectual integrity. Epistemic responsibility The obligation to proportion belief, action, and authority to truth, evidence, reasoning, and the limits of knowledge. Intellectual honesty; sincerity; ikhlāṣ; trustworthiness; verification; discipline; humility; evidence; accountability. | |||
== 14 Dialectic | Dialectical transition: A truth-seeking project cannot function without a willingness to revise treasured beliefs. This is a chosen conative commitment, not a theorem forced by logic alone. | ||
Epistemic integrity is a disposition to pursue and communicate truth while resisting bias, self-deception and unwarranted confidence. In plain language, preferring what is justified over what is comforting. A truth-seeking project cannot function without a willingness to revise treasured beliefs. This is a chosen conative commitment, not a theorem forced by logic alone. | |||
== 14. Dialektikē (Dialectic) == | |||
''al-jadal al-burhānī / al-burhān (الجدل البرهاني / البرهان) • Dialektikē (διαλεκτική)'' | ''al-jadal al-burhānī / al-burhān (الجدل البرهاني / البرهان) • Dialektikē (διαλεκτική)'' | ||
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=== Dialectic and rational entailment === | === Dialectic and rational entailment === | ||
Because claims must be connected by explicit reasons, inquiry tests hypotheses, seeks first principles and traces consequences. A historically Platonic label names the architecture without assuming that every intended step is deductively proven. | |||
Dialectic and rational entailment is a method of rational inquiry through defining concepts, testing alternatives and assessing arguments and consequences. In plain language, working through questions carefully rather than asserting answers. Because claims must be connected by explicit reasons, inquiry tests hypotheses, seeks first principles and traces consequences. A historically Platonic label names the architecture without assuming that every intended step is deductively proven. | |||
== 15 Reason | == 15. Logos (Reason) == | ||
''al-naẓar al-ʿaqlī (النظر العقلي) • Logos (λόγος)'' | ''al-naẓar al-ʿaqlī (النظر العقلي) • Logos (λόγος)'' | ||
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=== Epistemological rationalism === | === Epistemological rationalism === | ||
Since intellect is the truth-discerning capacity (Noetic discernment), reason is treated as the primary method of judgement, correction, and justification, hence Epistemological rationalism. | |||
Dialectical transition: Reason supplies standards of consistency and inference; observation and testimony supply many premises. Primacy means rational adjudication, not replacing empirical evidence with speculation. | |||
Epistemological rationalism is the epistemological priority of argument and rational justification in judging claims, while permitting observation as evidence. In plain language, using reasoning to make sense of evidence. Reason supplies standards of consistency and inference; observation and testimony supply many premises. Primacy means rational adjudication, not replacing empirical evidence with speculation. | |||
== 16 Inquiry | == 16. Zētēsis (Inquiry) == | ||
''ijtihād / tawāḍuʿ maʿrifī (اجتهاد / تواضع معرفي) • Zētēsis (ζήτησις)'' | ''ijtihād / tawāḍuʿ maʿrifī (اجتهاد / تواضع معرفي) • Zētēsis (ζήτησις)'' | ||
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=== Epistemic fallibilism === | === Epistemic fallibilism === | ||
Finite cognition can err even when it genuinely knows some truths; a method committed to truth must therefore distinguish justified confidence from infallibility and remain revisable. | |||
== 17 Division | Epistemic fallibilism is the doctrine that human beliefs and justification remain open to correction even when well supported. In plain language, being willing to change one's mind when shown better reasons. Finite cognition can err even when it genuinely knows some truths; a method committed to truth must therefore distinguish justified confidence from infallibility and remain revisable. | ||
== 17. Diairesis (Division) == | |||
''Diairesis (διαίρεσις) • taqsīm al-ʿulūm (تقسيم العلوم)'' | ''Diairesis (διαίρεσις) • taqsīm al-ʿulūm (تقسيم العلوم)'' | ||
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=== Methodological domain differentiation === | === Methodological domain differentiation === | ||
Different objects call for different tests: argument for necessary claims, experiment for natural regularities, and source criticism for past human events. This modern method partition is compatible with Platonic differentiation but was not Plato’s own complete system. | |||
== 18 Reason and being | Methodological domain differentiation is the allocation of inquiry to different evidential and inferential methods appropriate to their subject matter. In plain language, use logic for logic, experiments for nature and source criticism for history. Different objects call for different tests: argument for necessary claims, experiment for natural regularities, and source criticism for past human events. This modern method partition is compatible with Platonic differentiation but was not Plato’s own complete system. | ||
== 18. Logos kai ousia (Reason and being) == | |||
''Logos / ousia (λόγος / οὐσία) • maʿqūliyyat al-wujūd (معقولية الوجود)'' | ''Logos / ousia (λόγος / οὐσία) • maʿqūliyyat al-wujūd (معقولية الوجود)'' | ||
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=== Metaphysical rationalism === | === Metaphysical rationalism === | ||
Since intellect can know reality (Epistemological rationalism), reality itself is derived as intelligible rather than ultimately chaotic, arbitrary, or opaque to reason, hence Metaphysical rationalism. | |||
Dialectical transition: The success of intelligible inquiry supports confidence in knowable structure; perfect intelligibility or the absence of brute facts requires a stronger explanatory premise. | |||
Metaphysical rationalism is the metaphysical commitment that reality has intelligible structure susceptible, in principle, to rational explanation. In plain language, the world is not assumed to be fundamentally beyond explanation. The success of intelligible inquiry supports confidence in knowable structure; perfect intelligibility or the absence of brute facts requires a stronger explanatory premise. | |||
== 19 Cause and explanation | == 19. Aitia kai logos (Cause and explanation) == | ||
''Aitia / logos (αἰτία / λόγος) • al-ʿilla / al-taʿlīl (العلة / التعليل) • Hetu (हेतु)'' | ''Aitia / logos (αἰτία / λόγος) • al-ʿilla / al-taʿlīl (العلة / التعليل) • Hetu (हेतु) • Explanation • cause • ground • reason why • sufficient reason • causal order • intelligible ground • account • ʿillah'' | ||
''“...a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing.”'' | ''“...a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing.”'' | ||
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=== Principle of sufficient reason === | === Principle of sufficient reason === | ||
Every real state of affairs has some reason or ground. | |||
Whatever is real is, in principle, intelligible: it has some reason, ground, or explanation for why it is rather than is not, even if that ground is intrinsic rather than external, simple rather than composite, or presently unknown to us. This minimal form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason does not assume that every explanation is easy, exhaustive, or immediately accessible. It asserts only that reality is not brute chaos. | |||
To affirm intelligibility is to affirm that existence is not finally resistant to reason, even where human understanding remains partial, provisional, or domain-limited. | |||
''“And other is always relative to other, is it not?”'' | The demand that reality, events, beliefs, and claims be accountable to explanation rather than accepted as brute assertion. Explanation; cause; ground; reason why; sufficient reason; causal order; intelligible ground; account; ʿillah. | ||
Take as an explicit metaphysical commitment the minimal claim that every dependent fact has an adequate ground. Plato’s search for aitiai anticipates explanatory inquiry, not the complete modern PSR. | |||
Principle of sufficient reason is a grounding principle requiring an adequate explanation of dependent facts rather than allowing dependence to remain wholly brute. In plain language, ask what makes dependent things the case. Take as an explicit metaphysical commitment the minimal claim that every dependent fact has an adequate ground. Plato’s search for aitiai anticipates explanatory inquiry, not the complete modern PSR. | |||
== 20. Heteron (Otherness) == | |||
''al-imtiyāz / al-tamāyuz (الامتياز / التمايز) • Heteron (ἕτερον)'' | |||
''“And other is always relative to other, is it not?”'' | |||
<br />- Plato, Sophist, 255d<br> | <br />- Plato, Sophist, 255d<br> | ||
<br />''“You know that what is affirmed is different from what is not affirmed.”'' | <br />''“You know that what is affirmed is different from what is not affirmed.”'' | ||
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=== Principle of difference === | === Principle of difference === | ||
ince every real fact requires a sufficient reason (Principle of sufficient reason), any real distinction must be grounded in something that makes the distinguished realities different. Two realities cannot be numerically distinct while possessing no differentiating feature, relation, limit, origin, structure, position, state, or mode of existence whatsoever. | |||
The Principle of difference therefore states: | |||
Every real difference requires a real difference-maker. For any realities x and y, if x is really distinct from y, there must be some real respect in which x differs from y and which grounds their non-identity. If no such differentiating ground exists, x and y are not really distinct. | |||
The principle distinguishes a real distinction from a merely conceptual distinction. The intellect may understand or describe one reality through several concepts without thereby multiplying that reality. For example, referring to something as both a cause and an existent does not by itself establish the existence of two separate things. Genuine plurality requires a real basis of individuation. | |||
The Principle of difference therefore excludes brute or groundless plurality. It also supports Ontological parsimony and later entails that an absolutely necessary reality cannot contain genuinely distinct components, properties, states, or internal divisions unless there is some ground differentiating them. Any such differentiating ground would introduce limitation, composition, or dependence and would therefore be incompatible with Necessary simplicity and Absolute necessary simplicity. | |||
Dialectical transition: Once differences can be identified, the stronger claim that every numerical difference has a real ontological difference-maker requires an additional grounding premise. It is stronger than the mere law of identity and faces objections from cases of allegedly indiscernible particulars; it cannot be derived from the PSR without argument. | |||
Principle of difference is a strong metaphysical thesis that numerical distinctions require an adequate real basis of differentiation. In plain language, genuinely different things must differ somehow, if this further principle is adopted. Once differences can be identified, the stronger claim that every numerical difference has a real ontological difference-maker requires an additional grounding premise. It is stronger than the mere law of identity and faces objections from cases of allegedly indiscernible particulars; it cannot be derived from the PSR without argument. | |||
== 21 Becoming and participation | == 21. Genesis kai methexis (Becoming and participation) == | ||
''al-imkān wa-l-iftiqār (الإمكان والافتقار) • Genesis / methexis (γένεσις / μέθεξις)'' | ''al-imkān wa-l-iftiqār (الإمكان والافتقار) • Genesis / methexis (γένεσις / μέθεξις)'' | ||
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=== Contingency and dependent existence === | === Contingency and dependent existence === | ||
Some things exist but could, in principle, not have existed. | |||
There exist beings whose non-existence involves no contradiction, and whose actuality therefore does not arise from necessity contained wholly within themselves. Such beings are contingent: they are, but need not have been. Recognition of contingency is indispensable because it prevents the mind from mistaking mere actuality for necessity. It marks the distinction between what simply happens to exist and what must exist by virtue of its own nature. | |||
Once that distinction is recognised, the demand for explanation deepens: contingent beings cannot be their own ultimate sufficient reason. | |||
Objects whose existence depends on conditions provide instances of dependent existence. The precise modal claim that they could not have existed requires argument beyond observation. | |||
Contingency and dependent existence is the distinction between a necessary entity or fact and one that depends on conditions and might not have obtained. In plain language, some things exist only because other conditions obtain. Objects whose existence depends on conditions provide instances of dependent existence. The precise modal claim that they could not have existed requires argument beyond observation. | |||
== 22 First principle and the unhypothetical | == 22. Archē kai anhypotheton (First principle and the unhypothetical) == | ||
''Archē / anhypotheton (ἀρχή / ἀνυπόθετον) • manʿ al-dawr wa-l-tasalsul (منع الدور والتسلسل)'' | ''Archē / anhypotheton (ἀρχή / ἀνυπόθετον) • manʿ al-dawr wa-l-tasalsul (منع الدور والتسلسل)'' | ||
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=== Non-circular grounding and rejection of vicious infinite regress === | === Non-circular grounding and rejection of vicious infinite regress === | ||
Explanation cannot be self-grounding in a viciously circular sense, nor can it be deferred without end through an infinite chain of merely derivative dependence. A circle explains nothing if each member depends for its intelligibility on the others while none possesses self-sufficiency; likewise, an endless regress of dependent explanations never arrives at an actual ground. | |||
== 23 First principle | For explanation to succeed, a chain of dependence must terminate in that which is not merely borrowed, conditioned, or derivative, but self-sufficient. Without such termination, explanation is only postponed, not achieved. | ||
A circular chain in which every member borrows its grounding fails to explain itself. Whether every infinite dependence chain is vicious requires a separate well-foundedness principle. | |||
Non-circular grounding and rejection of vicious infinite regress is the denial of viciously circular explanation and, under a further well-foundedness assumption, endlessly ungrounded derivative chains. In plain language, a series of borrowed explanations cannot by itself explain why anything is grounded. A circular chain in which every member borrows its grounding fails to explain itself. Whether every infinite dependence chain is vicious requires a separate well-foundedness principle. | |||
== 23. Archē (First principle) == | |||
''al-mabādiʾ al-ūlā (المبادئ الأولى) • Archē (ἀρχή)'' | ''al-mabādiʾ al-ūlā (المبادئ الأولى) • Archē (ἀρχή)'' | ||
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=== Foundationalism === | === Foundationalism === | ||
Since explanation cannot regress indefinitely without grounding (Principle of sufficient reason), inquiry is directed toward first principles, hence Foundationalism. | |||
Dialectical transition: The demand not to rely entirely on unsupported premises motivates searching for foundational commitments; whether all justification must terminate is itself a debated epistemological choice. | |||
Foundationalism is an epistemological approach locating ultimate justification in basic claims or principles not justified by an endless chain. In plain language, reasoning seeks starting points that do not merely borrow support forever. The demand not to rely entirely on unsupported premises motivates searching for foundational commitments; whether all justification must terminate is itself a debated epistemological choice. | |||
== 24 Simple | == 24. Haploun (Simple) == | ||
''Haploun (ἁπλοῦν) • iqtiṣād fī al-furūḍ (اقتصاد في الفروض)'' | ''Haploun (ἁπλοῦν) • iqtiṣād fī al-furūḍ (اقتصاد في الفروض)'' | ||
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=== Epistemic parsimony === | === Epistemic parsimony === | ||
Since inquiry seeks grounded explanation (Principle of sufficient reason and Foundationalism), assumptions should not be multiplied beyond necessity, hence Epistemic parsimony. | |||
== 25 Sufficient | Dialectical transition: When explanations fit the same evidence equally well, preferring the one with fewer unsupported assumptions is a defeasible research rule rather than a logical axiom. | ||
Epistemic parsimony is the methodological preference for fewer unsupported assumptions when rival explanations otherwise perform comparably. In plain language, do not add complications that explain nothing. When explanations fit the same evidence equally well, preferring the one with fewer unsupported assumptions is a defeasible research rule rather than a logical axiom. | |||
== 25. Hikanon (Sufficient) == | |||
''Hikanon (ἱκανόν) • kifāyat al-taʿlīl (كفاية التعليل)'' | ''Hikanon (ἱκανόν) • kifāyat al-taʿlīl (كفاية التعليل)'' | ||
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=== Principle of explanatory adequacy === | === Principle of explanatory adequacy === | ||
A proposed ultimate ground must explain—rather than merely rename—the dependent features it is invoked to ground. The explanatory burden is especially important for consciousness; the ground need not simply instantiate every property of its consequences. | |||
Principle of explanatory adequacy is the demand that an explanation actually account for the features it purports to explain. In plain language, giving a mystery a new name is not solving it. A proposed ultimate ground must explain—rather than merely rename—the dependent features it is invoked to ground. The explanatory burden is especially important for consciousness; the ground need not simply instantiate every property of its consequences. | |||
== 26 One and simple | == 26. Hen kai haploun (One and simple) == | ||
''al-basāṭa / waḥdat al-aṣl (البساطة / وحدة الأصل) • Hen / haploun (ἕν / ἁπλοῦν)'' | ''al-basāṭa / waḥdat al-aṣl (البساطة / وحدة الأصل) • Hen / haploun (ἕν / ἁπλοῦν)'' | ||
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=== Ontological parsimony === | === Ontological parsimony === | ||
Since unnecessary assumptions should be avoided (Epistemic parsimony), ultimate entities, substances, and principles should not be multiplied beyond necessity, hence Ontological parsimony. | |||
Dialectical transition: The preference for an explanatorily unified ontology is a defeasible constraint; it does not entail that only one substance exists without further premises. | |||
Ontological parsimony is the ontological preference for positing no more kinds of fundamental entities than explanatory adequacy requires. In plain language, avoid unnecessary fundamental things. The preference for an explanatorily unified ontology is a defeasible constraint; it does not entail that only one substance exists without further premises. | |||
== 27 Priority and cause | == 27. Proteron kai aitia (Priority and cause) == | ||
''al-taqaddum al-wujūdī (التقدم الوجودي) • Proteron / aitia (πρότερον / αἰτία)'' | ''al-taqaddum al-wujūdī (التقدم الوجودي) • Proteron / aitia (πρότερον / αἰτία)'' | ||
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=== Ontological priority === | === Ontological priority === | ||
Since some realities explain others more basically than they are explained by them (Epistemic parsimony and Ontological parsimony), reality is ordered according to what is fundamental and what is derivative, hence Ontological priority. | |||
== 28 Soul and intellect | Dialectical transition: When A explains B without the reverse dependence, A is prior in grounding, not necessarily earlier in time. | ||
Ontological priority is the asymmetric dependence relation by which something is more fundamental than what it grounds. In plain language, what explains another thing may be prior without being earlier in time. When A explains B without the reverse dependence, A is prior in grounding, not necessarily earlier in time. | |||
== 28. Psychē kai nous (Soul and intellect) == | |||
''al-nafs / al-shuʿūr (النفس / الشعور) • Psychē / nous (ψυχή / νοῦς)'' | ''al-nafs / al-shuʿūr (النفس / الشعور) • Psychē / nous (ψυχή / νοῦς)'' | ||
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=== Non-reductive consciousness === | === Non-reductive consciousness === | ||
Since consciousness is the condition under which all objects, methods, and explanations appear (Phenomenal consciousness), and since ultimate entities, substances, and principles should not be multiplied beyond necessity (Ontological parsimony), consciousness cannot be treated merely as one ordinary object among others, hence Non-reductive consciousness. | |||
No third-person description by itself establishes why subjective character occurs; the explanatory gap motivates but does not prove non-reduction. | |||
Non-reductive consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness cannot be exhaustively identified with a purely third-person functional or physical account. In plain language, describing a mechanism does not automatically explain why experience feels like anything. No third-person description by itself establishes why subjective character occurs; the explanatory gap motivates but does not prove non-reduction. | |||
== 29 Soul and the intelligible | == 29. Psychē kai noēton (Soul and the intelligible) == | ||
''aṣālat al-idrāk / aṣālat al-shuʿūr (أصالة الإدراك / أصالة الشعور) • Psychē / noēton (ψυχή / νοητόν)'' | ''aṣālat al-idrāk / aṣālat al-shuʿūr (أصالة الإدراك / أصالة الشعور) • Psychē / noēton (ψυχή / νοητόν)'' | ||
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=== Priority of consciousness === | === Priority of consciousness === | ||
Since consciousness is the first datum and the condition of intelligibility (Phenomenal consciousness), consciousness is treated as prior in explanation to what appears within it, hence the Priority of consciousness. | |||
== 30 Being and soul | Dialectical transition: Epistemic priority is immediate; ontological priority is a proposed stronger conclusion requiring an anti-physicalist or explanatory argument. | ||
Priority of consciousness is the proposed ontological or explanatory primacy of consciousness, distinguished from its uncontroversial priority as a datum of inquiry. In plain language, experience is where investigation begins, but that alone does not prove all reality is mental. Epistemic priority is immediate; ontological priority is a proposed stronger conclusion requiring an anti-physicalist or explanatory argument. | |||
== 30. Ousia kai psychē (Being and soul) == | |||
''Ousia / psychē (οὐσία / ψυχή) • waḥdat al-ḥuḍūr wa-l-wujūd (وحدة الحضور والوجود)'' | ''Ousia / psychē (οὐσία / ψυχή) • waḥdat al-ḥuḍūr wa-l-wujūd (وحدة الحضور والوجود)'' | ||
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=== Consciousness–existence non-separability === | === Consciousness–existence non-separability === | ||
Under the proposed model, consciousness is not an accidental property added to an independently intelligible substrate but existence disclosed from within. The identification must be supported independently rather than defined into truth. | |||
Consciousness–existence non-separability is the metaphysical proposal that being and conscious disclosure are inseparable aspects of ultimate reality. In plain language, on this model, existence is not finally something standing outside all awareness. Under the proposed model, consciousness is not an accidental property added to an independently intelligible substrate but existence disclosed from within. The identification must be supported independently rather than defined into truth. | |||
== 31 Intelligible and soul ''Noēton / psychē'' == | == 31 Intelligible and soul ''Noēton / psychē'' == | ||
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'''Political Sovereignty of Intellect''' is the normative claim that political decisions should be constrained by rational understanding of public welfare. In plain language, governing requires knowledge and judgment, not merely strength or popularity. Political decisions affect welfare and need knowledge of causes and consequences; authority should therefore be answerable to the best available reasons and moral aims rather than arbitrary status. | '''Political Sovereignty of Intellect''' is the normative claim that political decisions should be constrained by rational understanding of public welfare. In plain language, governing requires knowledge and judgment, not merely strength or popularity. Political decisions affect welfare and need knowledge of causes and consequences; authority should therefore be answerable to the best available reasons and moral aims rather than arbitrary status. | ||
== 124 Philosopher-kings and constitution | == 124. Philosophoi basileusōsin kai politeia (Philosopher-kings and constitution) == | ||
''ḥākimiyyat al-ʿaql / ḥukm al-ḥukamāʾ (حاكمية العقل / حكم الحكماء) • Philosophoi basileusōsin / politeia (φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν / πολιτεία)'' | ''ḥākimiyyat al-ʿaql / ḥukm al-ḥukamāʾ (حاكمية العقل / حكم الحكماء) • Philosophoi basileusōsin / politeia (φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν / πολιτεία)'' | ||
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=== 31. Noēton / psychē (νοητόν / ψυχή) — al-mithāliyya al-taḥlīliyya (المثالية التحليلية): Analytic idealism === | === 31. Noēton / psychē (νοητόν / ψυχή) — al-mithāliyya al-taḥlīliyya (المثالية التحليلية): Analytic idealism === | ||