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Since reality is intelligible (Metaphysical rationalism), every being, event, claim, and distinction must be answerable to explanation rather than accepted as brute assertion, hence the Principle of sufficient reason.

=== 10) Principle of difference ===

Since every real fact requires a sufficient reason ([[#9) Principle of sufficient reason|Principle of sufficient reason]]), any real distinction must be grounded in something that makes the distinguished realities different. Two realities cannot be numerically distinct while possessing no differentiating feature, relation, limit, origin, structure, position, state, or mode of existence whatsoever.

The '''Principle of difference''' therefore states:

<blockquote>Every real difference requires a real difference-maker. For any realities ''x'' and ''y'', if ''x'' is really distinct from ''y'', there must be some real respect in which ''x'' differs from ''y'' and which grounds their non-identity. If no such differentiating ground exists, ''x'' and ''y'' are not really distinct.</blockquote>

The principle distinguishes a '''real distinction''' from a merely '''conceptual distinction'''. The intellect may understand or describe one reality through several concepts without thereby multiplying that reality. For example, referring to something as both a cause and an existent does not by itself establish the existence of two separate things. Genuine plurality requires a real basis of individuation.

The Principle of difference therefore excludes brute or groundless plurality. It also supports [[#12) Ontological parsimony|Ontological parsimony]] and later entails that an absolutely necessary reality cannot contain genuinely distinct components, properties, states, or internal divisions unless there is some ground differentiating them. Any such differentiating ground would introduce limitation, composition, or dependence and would therefore be incompatible with [[#20) Necessary simplicity|Necessary simplicity]] and [[#21) Absolute necessary simplicity|Absolute necessary simplicity]].

=== 10) Foundationalism ===

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Since some realities explain others more basically than they are explained by them (Epistemic parsimony and Ontological parsimony), reality is ordered according to what is fundamental and what is derivative, hence Ontological priority.

=== 14) Qualified ontological monism

'''Advaita Vedānta • Monism • Non-dualism • Oneness of being • Ontological monism • Priority monism • Unity of being • Waḥdat al-wujūd'''

Reality is ultimately one, but differentiated into real derivative modes, grades, manifestations, or articulations.

=== 14) Non-reductive consciousness ===

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Its relationship to other traditions is therefore both comparative and critical. It does not treat all religions and philosophies as identical, but neither does it treat historically inherited forms as ultimate in themselves. Instead, it seeks to identify the rational entailments that may be expressed beneath different names, symbols, myths, titles, metaphors, and institutions.

[[Twelverism]]

== Criticism and contested issues ==

@@ Line 270: / Line 270: @@
 Since reality is intelligible (Metaphysical rationalism), every being, event, claim, and distinction must be answerable to explanation rather than accepted as brute assertion, hence the Principle of sufficient reason.
+=== 10) Principle of difference ===
+Since every real fact requires a sufficient reason ([[#9) Principle of sufficient reason|Principle of sufficient reason]]), any real distinction must be grounded in something that makes the distinguished realities different. Two realities cannot be numerically distinct while possessing no differentiating feature, relation, limit, origin, structure, position, state, or mode of existence whatsoever.
+The '''Principle of difference''' therefore states:
+<blockquote>Every real difference requires a real difference-maker. For any realities ''x'' and ''y'', if ''x'' is really distinct from ''y'', there must be some real respect in which ''x'' differs from ''y'' and which grounds their non-identity. If no such differentiating ground exists, ''x'' and ''y'' are not really distinct.</blockquote>
+The principle distinguishes a '''real distinction''' from a merely '''conceptual distinction'''. The intellect may understand or describe one reality through several concepts without thereby multiplying that reality. For example, referring to something as both a cause and an existent does not by itself establish the existence of two separate things. Genuine plurality requires a real basis of individuation.
+The Principle of difference therefore excludes brute or groundless plurality. It also supports [[#12) Ontological parsimony|Ontological parsimony]] and later entails that an absolutely necessary reality cannot contain genuinely distinct components, properties, states, or internal divisions unless there is some ground differentiating them. Any such differentiating ground would introduce limitation, composition, or dependence and would therefore be incompatible with [[#20) Necessary simplicity|Necessary simplicity]] and [[#21) Absolute necessary simplicity|Absolute necessary simplicity]].
 === 10) Foundationalism ===
@@ Line 286: / Line 298: @@
 Since some realities explain others more basically than they are explained by them (Epistemic parsimony and Ontological parsimony), reality is ordered according to what is fundamental and what is derivative, hence Ontological priority.
+=== 14) Qualified ontological monism
+'''Advaita Vedānta • Monism • Non-dualism • Oneness of being • Ontological monism • Priority monism • Unity of being • Waḥdat al-wujūd'''
+Reality is ultimately one, but differentiated into real derivative modes, grades, manifestations, or articulations.
 === 14) Non-reductive consciousness ===
@@ Line 1,238: / Line 1,256: @@
 Its relationship to other traditions is therefore both comparative and critical. It does not treat all religions and philosophies as identical, but neither does it treat historically inherited forms as ultimate in themselves. Instead, it seeks to identify the rational entailments that may be expressed beneath different names, symbols, myths, titles, metaphors, and institutions.
+[[Twelverism]]
 == Criticism and contested issues ==